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The authors present a lucid overview of theories of international economics, with an emphasis on recent contributions such as imperfect competition, multinational corporations, agglomeration and ...

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This book reviews recent progress in the theory of oligopoly and market leadership and provides new results on the theory of Stackelberg competition and Nash competition with strategic investment under endogenous entry. These theories are applied to models of competition in quantities, prices and to patent races. The results are used to propose a new approach to competition policy and issues of the abuse of dominance.

This is a key year for the evolution of international markets. The global economy is experiencing the most severe downturn since the thirties, it is temporarily leaving a path of sustained growth that characterized the last decades, and is facing an impressive decline of trade between countries. Banks are going bankrupt, the stock market has crashed, rms are going out of bu- ness or drastically reducing their production and exports, workers are being red and investment in new business creation or innovation is shrinking. Meanwhile, consumers can dence has dropped at its minimum, aggregate demand has been declining for months and expansionary policies and int- national coordination have failed to counteract the crisis until now. It is quite likely that all this will change sooner or later, but at the end of this crisis our understanding of the macroeconomy may change as well. In front of these crucial events, this book is not an attempt at proposing a radically new way of interpreting macroeconomic phenomena, and, as a m- ter of fact, it is not even a book on macroeconomic theory. My more modest goal is to collect a number of insights derived from recent research on the role of competition and innovation in the analysis of three topics: business cycles, trade and growth through innovations.

Industrial Organization: Markets and Strategies provides an up-to-date account of modern industrial organization that blends theory with real-world applications. Written in a clear and accessible style, it acquaints the reader with the most important models for understanding strategies chosen by firms with market power and shows how such firms adapt to different market environments. It covers a wide range of topics including recent developments on product bundling, branding strategies, restrictions in vertical supply relationships, intellectual property protection, and two-sided markets, to name just a few. Models are presented in detail and the main results are summarized as lessons. Formal theory is complemented throughout by real-world cases that show students how it applies to actual organizational settings. The book is accompanied by a website containing a number of additional resources for lecturers and students, including exercises, answers to review questions, case material and slides.

This book represents a fresh approach to EC competition law - one that is of singular value in grappling with the huge economic challenges we face today. As a critical analysis of the law and options available to European competition authorities and legal practitioners in the field, it stands without peer. It will be greatly welcomed by lawyers, policymakers and other interested professionals in Europe and throughout the world.

Sunk Costs and Market Structure bridges the gap between the new generation of game theoretic models that has dominated the industrial organization literature recently and the traditional empirical agenda of the subject as embodied in the structure-conduct-performance paradigm developed by Joe S. Bain and his successors. Because many results turn out to depend on detailed features of the market that are difficult to measure, some observers argue that the game theory literature offers little basis for the kind of cross-industry studies that have formed the empirical base of the subject since the 1950s. Using current game-theoretic methods, John Sutton reexamines the traditional agenda. He argues that despite the "delicate" nature of many results, there are theoretical predictions that turn out to be extremely robust to reasonable changes in model specification, and these results should be taken into account when looking for statistical regularities across a broad spectrum of different industries. Sutton assembles a matrix of industry studies relating to twenty markets within the food and drink sector, in six countries—France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. He combines theory, econometric evidence, and a detailed account of the various patterns of evolution of structure found in these industries in a rigorous evaluation of the strengths and limitations of a game-theoretic approach in explaining the evolution of industrial structure.

In his book „Marktform und Gleichgewicht“, published initially in 1934, Heinrich von Stackelberg presented his groundbreaking leadership model of firm competition. In a work of great originality and richness, he described and analyzed a market situation in which the leader firm moves first and the follower firms then move sequentially. This game-theoretic model, now widely known as Stackelberg competition, has had tremendous impact on the theory of the firm and economic analysis in general, and has been applied to study decision-making in various fields of business. As the first translation of von Stackelberg's book into English, this volume makes his classic work available in its original form to an English-speaking audience for the very first time.

This book presents a theoretical investigation of the formation of regional free trade agreements (FTAs), the behavior of global enterprises, and government trade policies in various game forms including multi-stage games, repeated games, and timing games. In the last few decades, the number of FTAs has been rapidly increasing in the world, especially in Asia. In particular, East Asian countries are expected to be main engines for sustaining the world economy. Focusing on East Asian economies, strategic behaviors of governments and firms in order to attain their own aims are examined. The analytical methods employed in this book are those currently being developed or that recently have been created. The topics are important contemporary issues in regional areas facing the rapid economic changes brought about by globalization. Most chapters of this book are based on original work that was published in international journals but now has been completely rewritten, with restructuring and extension of the original work. This book, with its up-to-date information, will be of interest to academic researchers in universities and economic research institutions and to students working on advanced degrees in economics.

Game theory explores situations in which agents interact strategically and provides a useful foundation for studying many traditional industrial organization topics. This approach has also enabled the emergence of new areas of enquiry including law and economics, networks, the digital economy, auctions, experimental game theory and many others.This second volume of the Handbook includes original contributions by experts in the field. It provides up-to-date surveys of the most relevant applications of game theory to industrial organization. The book covers both classical and industrial organization topics such as mergers in markets with homogeneous and differentiated goods, leniency and coordinated effects in cartels and mergers, static and dynamic contests, consumer search and product safety, strategic delegation, platforms and network effects, auctions, environmental and resource economics, intellectual property, healthcare, corruption, experimental industrial organization, and empirical models of research and development.Authoritative and engaging, this unique Handbook will be an indispensable resource for all serious academics, researchers and students of industrial economics and game theory.

The first volume of this wide-ranging Handbook contains original contributions by world-class specialists. It provides up-to-date surveys of the main game-theoretic tools commonly used to model industrial organization topics. The Handbook covers numerous subjects in detail including, among others, the tools of lattice programming, supermodular and aggregative games, monopolistic competition, horizontal and vertically differentiated good models, dynamic and Stackelberg games, entry games, evolutionary games with adaptive players, asymmetric information, moral hazard, learning and information sharing models.

The 2014 International Conference on Future Information Engineering and Manufacturing Science (FIEMS 2014) was held June 26-27 in Beijing, China. The objective of FIEMS 2014 was to provide a platform for researchers, engineers, academics as well as industry professionals from all over the world to present their research results and development acti

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